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5.1  Introduction 
An important theme in recent research on immigration is the documen- 
tation of trends in the skills of immigrants to the United States compared 
to those of native-born Americans. While the original interest in that ques- 
tion centered on isolating the “true” life-cycle assimilation process from 
successive cross-sectional surveys such as the decennial censuses, more 
recently concern has been expressed that any decline in the relative labor 
market quality of immigrants is alarming in itself. Less studied has been 
the issue of the determinants of the changing skills of new U.S. immi- 
grants. As in conventional models of migration, both the number and skill 
of immigrants to the United States are likely to be influenced by economic 
and social conditions in origin countries and in the destination country, 
the United States. However, US. immigration flows are also importantly 
affected by laws governing the number of immigrants who may be admit- 
ted and the criteria by which they are selected. 
Because the standard sources of data that have been used to study the 
skill composition of US. immigrants, such as census data, do not distin- 
guish among the foreign born by their legal status (legal, illegal, nonimmi- 
grant), we do not know whether any resulting secular trends characterize 
legal or illegal immigrant flows alone or some unknown amalgam of the 
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two. This distinction is important, as levels and trends in the “labor market 
quality” of legal immigrant flows are quite different from those of illegal 
immigrants. Proposals to reduce legal immigrant flows in response to con- 
cerns about declining immigrant quality could produce the opposite result 
by reducing high-labor-market-quality legal immigrants and encouraging 
additional low-labor-market-quality illegal immigrant flows. In addition, 
conventional surveys do not contain any information on admission crite- 
ria (visa type) so that little is known about how changes in U.S. immigra- 
tion admission criteria have shaped or will shape the composition of legal 
immigrants. And over the past 25 years, U.S. immigration law has under- 
gone substantial change. 
Two fundamental features characterize US. immigration law in the pe- 
riod  since  1921: First, the  United  States restricts  the number of immi- 
grants (restricting since 192  1 the number from the Eastern Hemisphere, 
and since 1968 the number from the Western Hemisphere). Second, imme- 
diate relatives of U.S. citizens are exempt from numerical restriction.’ Over 
the years, the United States has altered both the definition of immediate 
relatives of U.S. citizens (e.g., in  1952 extending to U.S. women citizens 
the right, already held by men, to sponsor the immigration of an alien 
spouse outside the numerical limitations) and the system for granting nu- 
merically limited visas (e.g., establishing a structure of preference catego- 
ries in 1965 but not placing the Western Hemisphere under that structure 
until 1977). 
These features of U.S. law combine with the overall attractiveness of the 
United States to produce a situation that can be described by two facts: (1) 
More persons would like to immigrate to the United States than current 
or foreseeable law permits; and (2) whenever the immigration law regime 
changes, there are winners and losers among the pool of visa applicants. 
In such a world, we would expect to observe shifts in the number and skill 
of immigrants, because changes in  numerical  ceilings within  visa cate- 
gories defining who may enter change the selectivity of the overall immi- 
gration regime. For example, the law extending the preference-category 
system of visa allocation to the Western Hemisphere should produce, me- 
chanically, increases in the number of individuals admitted with prefer- 
ence-category visas, say,  as principals in employment-based categories.’ 
That same law,  however, may induce shifts in  the number  and skill of 
1. A few other classes of individuals are also exempt from numerical restriction, some as 
a permanent feature of US. law (e.g., American Indians born in Canada and children born 
abroad  to alien  residents),  others  under  temporary  provisions  (e.g., spouses  of  IRCA- 
legalized aliens in the special three-year program in effect in 1992-94).  Additionally, special 
legislation has permitted refugees previously admitted with temporary documents to adjust 
to permanent resident status outside the numerical limitations. 
2. While some visa categories provide visas only for a single individual (e.g., for the spouse 
of a U.S. citizen or for the parent of a US. citizen), other visa categories provide visas for 
the qualifying immigrant plus his or her spouse and minor children (e.g., for the sibling of a The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  187 
spouse immigrants, as persons who suddenly find themselves ineligible for 
a preference-category visa may come to find marriage to a US. citizen an 
attractive alternative. 
The objective of this paper is to describe and understand the determi- 
nants of changes in the number and quality of new legal immigrants to 
the United States over the last 25 years. Our main interest is in under- 
standing the behavioral response of potential immigrants to changes in 
the U.S. immigration law regime (as well as in the origin-country determi- 
nants of demand for immigration to the United  States) and how these 
affect and have affected the skill composition of immigrants. By  under- 
standing how the composition of legal immigrant flows shifts in response 
to immigration law changes, particularly in numerically unrestricted immi- 
gration categories, a better understanding of the consequences of future 
immigration reforms may be attained. We assemble a new data set based 
on annual Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records of all 
new, legal immigrants over the period 1972-95.  These data provide infor- 
mation on occupation for many of these immigrants as well as the criteria 
by which they were admitted. The data thus permit a new examination of 
the changing skill composition of legal immigrants as well as an investiga- 
tion of how these changes were influenced by  alterations in immigration 
law regimes and, with additional data, origin-country conditions. 
Our principal analytical focus is on the behavior of persons who be- 
come immigrants as husbands of U.S.  citizen^.^ We choose husband immi- 
grants for three reasons: (1) immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens, being nu- 
merically unlimited, provide a clear signal of demand for immigration; 
(2)  men present a more stable unit for studying skill in a period that saw 
substantial changes in women’s labor force participation; and (3) spouse 
immigrants make up a substantial and growing proportion  of all adult 
immigrants. Over the period we study, the average proportion of all male 
nonrefugee immigrants aged 21-65  who gained permanent residence by 
marrying a U.S. citizen was 31 percent, rising from 22 percent in 1972 to 
US. citizen together with the sibling’s spouse and minor children). In the latter case, the 
qualifying individual (is., the sibling) is known as the principal. Thus, in the employment- 
based categories, the principal is the individual who qualifies for the employment-based visa. 
3. U.S. citizens who marry (and sponsor the immigration of) foreign-born persons include 
both native-born U.S. citizens as well as earlier immigrants who have naturalized. The United 
States has not recorded systematically the nativity of the U.S. citizens who sponsor immi- 
grants; a special study carried out by  the U.S. General Accounting  Office (GAO) on the 
sponsors of immediate relatives who immigrated in  1985 indicates that approximately 80 
percent of those sponsors of spouses are native-born U.S. citizens. The main source countries 
of spouses for U.S. citizens are Mexico, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
West Germany. Patterns differ by gender, however. For example, although Mexico is the top 
source of mates for both men and women, the GAO estimates suggest that while Mexico 
provided almost 30 percent of husbands of U.S. citizens, it provided only about 15 percent of 
brides of U.S. citizens. Obviously, gender differences in both travel by U.S. citizens (including 
military service abroad)  and US. sojourns by  foreign-born  persons  account for  the ob- 
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34.4 percent in 1994. The proportion has been as high as 42 percent, in 
1986. Understanding the shifts in marital immigration thus provides a 
great deal of information on overall U.S. immigration. For comparison, 
and to assess our model, we  also examine the number and skill composi- 
tion of employment-based principal immigrants, a numerically limited cat- 
egory of immigrants that has always been a small proportion of  overall 
immigration but has been increased in size in recent years. 
Inspection of our new data indicates, consistent with information from 
the U.S. censuses and the Current Population Survey (CPS), that since the 
mid-l980s, the average skill of new, U.S. legal immigrants has been rising 
relative to  that of the U.S. population. An econometric analysis of a panel 
of country-specific measures of the skill of immigrants based on these data 
over the period  1972-92  indicates that these changes are due in part to 
changes in immigration law and to the overall rise in the real purchasing 
power of countries outside the United States. Our estimates also indicate 
that changes in restrictions in any visa category have spillover effects on 
the skill composition of immigrants in other categories due to substitution 
by prospective immigrants across the immigration routes by which they 
achieve permanent residence in the United States. Among other results, 
we find, for example, that the restrictions on fraudulent immigration mar- 
riages, which dramatically reduced  the number  of marital immigrants, 
lowered the average skill level of immigrants entering via employment cat- 
egories. 
5.2  What Are the Trends in the Labor Market 
Skills of U.S. Immigrants? 
In this section, we revisit the question of what has happened to the skill 
composition of U.S. immigrants over the past 25 years by providing some 
new  evidence on the  skills of  legal immigrants  for  the years  1972-95. 
Whatever the factual trends in skills of immigrants, there remains an issue 
of to what extent the trends are determined by changes in the legal struc- 
ture and rules  governing  U.S. immigration policy  and to what  extent 
trends reflect behavioral choices of immigrants and the U.S. population 
with whom they interact. We turn to this question in the next section. 
The principal evidence on what has been happening to the skills of im- 
migrants has been derived by many researchers from the 1970-90 decen- 
nial censuses. Based on this data source, a close to universal consensus 
has been reached: The labor market skills of new recent immigrants has 
been declining significantly relative to skills of the native born. For ex- 
ample, the recent National Academy report indicates that the education 
deficit of recent male immigrants compared to the native born grew from 
.3  of a year in 1970 to 1.4 years by 1990. Similarly, the new male immigrant The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  189 
wage gap expanded from 17 to 32 percent as measured in the 1970 and 
1990 cens~ses.~  Similar trends exist for female immigrants. 
There are a number of problems with relying solely on decennial census 
or CPS data to make claims about trends in the characteristics of recent 
immigrants. First, the samples on which conclusions are drawn may be 
neither recent nor immigrant. As is well know, it is not clear whether re- 
spondents, in answering the standard question about time since immigra- 
tion, are referring to their first, last, or most salient time of entry to the 
United States. Well-intentioned attempts to clarify the meaning of this 
question may further distort its usefulness for tracking secular trends. It 
is also well known that some-and  perhaps many-sampled  respondents 
in the census or CPS are not new legal immigrants. Demographic studies 
have shown not only that some fraction of illegal immigrants participate 
in these surveys but also that those more correctly characterized as nonim- 
migrants  are included  in the  analytical  category  “recent  immigrants.” 
Since nonimmigrants and illegal immigrants have, on average, relatively 
short stays in the United States, they are especially numerous among “re- 
cent immigrants.” This problem is quantitatively important. For example, 
a recent study estimated that only 52 percent of those who reported that 
they immigrated since 1990 in the 1995 and 1996 CPSs were legal immi- 
grants (Passel 1999). The rest were either nonimmigrants (10 percent) or 
illegal immigrants (38 percent). Because there is great additional uncer- 
tainty about secular trends in the numbers of such people who appear in 
our mainstream surveys, our ability to draw unambiguous conclusions is 
weakened. 
There is another, less often mentioned  problem with this reliance on 
census data for this question. The  10-year periodicity  between surveys 
means that the calendar years that end in nine are given enormous weight 
in our conclusions. If these years are for some reason atypical, we  are on 
treacherous ground indeed. But more importantly, we may well be point- 
ing in the wrong direction  about trends in the skills of immigrants  by 
knowing nothing about within-decennial-census trends. 
Because of these problems, we  take a different approach in this paper 
to addressing the relative skills of immigrants issue by relying instead on 
yearly INS data about new “green card” recipients in that year. This data 
source, described below,  has a number of distinct advantages as well  as 
some disadvantages for this question. First, sampling issues do not arise 
since, with a few exceptions that are noted elsewhere in this paper, these 
files contain all new green card  recipient^.^ Second, unlike the census or 
4.  See Smith and Edmonston (1997). 
5. Formally, the INS data for a specified fiscal year cover persons admitted to legal perma- 
nent residence during that year; the green card (the “paper” evidence of legal permanent 
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CPS, the population studied is well defined. In these data, new immigrants 
are defined as that year’s new green card recipients. By definition, all such 
new immigrants are legal immigrants. Third, we  also know the visa cate- 
gory under which the new immigrant was admitted. This critical informa- 
tion, unavailable in household surveys, allows us to separate out groups 
of immigrants by the admission criteria they satisfied. Numerical limits on 
visa types are one of the most important policy tools in setting immigra- 
tion policy. Finally, INS data contain new immigrants for all years so that 
we are not at the mercy of survey-based time intervak6 
There is an important disadvantage to the INS data as well. The infor- 
mation  available, especially relating to the skills of immigrants, is quite 
limited. For example, there exist no data on either education or income, 
the mainstays of economic analyses on this issue. The principal informa- 
tion pertinent to the skill issue is the new immigrant’s occupation. More- 
over, compared to the detail available in standard household surveys, INS 
occupation categories are highly aggregated, and a significant proportion 
of immigrants do not report their occupation. As do the census and CPS, 
INS occupation categories also undergo periodic revision. Nonetheless, in 
our view, the advantages of the INS surveys outweigh the disadvantages, 
especially if the INS data are viewed as a useful complement to standard 
household surveys. 
To construct an index of skill, we  first mapped all of the occupational 
codes in the INS files to a common set of 25 occupational categories, 
which have been used by the INS starting in 1983.’ We also mapped the 
1970, 1980, and 1990 census occupation codes into these 25 occupational 
categories. The temporal comparability of this mapping is not exact, an 
issue to which we  return  below. Based on the  1980 Public Use Census 
1/1000 sample, we  obtained the average earnings of all native-born men 
aged 21-65  working at least 35 hours in a “typical” week and at least 50 
weeks in 1979 for each of the 25 occupational categories. These earnings 
were then assigned to respondents according to which of the 25 occupa- 
tions they reported. An advantage of our fixed price index for evaluating 
skills is that any trends indicated by  this measure will not be sensitive to 
the changing prices of skills-a  very salient labor market reality during 
the period from 1970 through the 1990s. 
6. The advantages of INS data for studying legal immigrants have not gone wholly unno- 
ticed. Earlier studies of immigrant skills using INS data include Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986. 
1988, 1995), Barrett (1996), and Duleep and Regets (1996). 
7. The 24-year series of immigrant cohort data available in microfiles from the INS com- 
prises cohorts in which occupation is measured in three distict ways: In fiscal years 1972 and 
1973, INS coded occupation using the U.S. 1960 census detailed occupational classification; 
in fiscal years 1974-82,  INS coded occupation using the U.S. 1970 census detailed occupa- 
tional classification; and  since fiscal year  1983, INS has  coded  occupation using  a  25- 
category classification based on the U.S. 1980 census detailed occupational classification. The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  191 
Table 5.1  Average Occupation Income, 1970-90  U.S. Censuses (Recent 
Immigrants) 




19,899  19,002  18,485 
n.a.  n.a.  18,714 
n.a.  n.a.  18,172 
5.2.1  Occupational Earnings of the Foreign 
Born in the 1970-90 Censuses 
We first apply the occupational earnings methodology to the decennial 
census samples of recent male immigrants-those  with 1-5  years of immi- 
grant experience. Table 5.1 lists our occupation-imputed average incomes 
of recent census male immigrants. This series is consistent with our earlier 
summary of census-based trends. Based on our derived occupation-based 
income, there was a steady fall in the incomes of new “immigrants.” Across 
the full 20-year span, the income decline was 7.1 percent. This is quite 
comparable to a decline of 1 1.9 percent in recent immigrant hourly wages 
(measured directly in the census files) between 1970 and 1990.*  This com- 
parability may be especially close since the direct wage measures include 
the impact of the spreading out in the price of skill. 
Additional evidence that our occupation-income series may reasonably 
characterize time-series trends is contained in table 5.2, which lists average 
occupation incomes by major region of  residence. The first panel in this 
table documents the changing composition of recent immigrants, at least 
as revealed in the decennial censuses. The proportion of census-defined 
recent immigrants of Mexican origin increased significantly (especially be- 
tween 1970 and 1980) as did immigrants from other North American coun- 
tries (especially between 1980 and 1990).9  Europe was the principal region 
of decline as the fraction of  new immigrants who were from European 
countries fell from 32 percent (1970) to 12 percent (1990). Throughout the 
entire period, Asians represented a significant fraction of new immigrants. 
Not surprisingly, occupation  incomes of  Mexican-origin  immigrants 
stand out as being particularly low. The rising fraction of immigrants from 
Mexico over this period indicates that there were nontrivial composition 
effects in the immigrant pool, an observation that must always be taken 
into account when describing trends. There were also strong within-region 
trends in occupation incomes (downward) in the other North American 
and Asian regions that largely reflect the changing composition of immi- 
gration within these regions. 
8. See Smith and Edmonston (1997), table 5.2. 
9. The principal source of other North American population growth was immigrants from 
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Table 5.2  Descriptive Statistics, 1970-90  U.S. Censuses (Recent Immigrants) 
Country of Birth  1970  1980  1990 
Percent of population 
Mexico 













Average education (years) 
Mexico 










































































However, some hint that not all may be so clear and neat is contained 
in the 1990 column of  table 5.1, which separates recent immigrants into 
the very recent (1-3  years) and the not quite so recent (4-5  years).'O In 
that year, more-recent immigrants actually have higher occupation-based 
incomes than those who reported that they arrived during 1986 and 1985. 
While this disparity could reflect a rapid and already completed selective 
out-migration of the more skilled among the original cohort of 1986 and 
1985 immigrants, it could also signal some within-period reversal of trend. 
Although census data cannot resolve this issue, the INS immigrant files 
are ideally suited for the task. 
5.2.2  Occupational Earnings of New Legal Immigrants 
and the US. Population, 1972-95 
To assess how the skills of legal immigrants have changed on an annual 
basis over the period, we use all of the available public use files containing 
official administrative microdata on persons admitted to legal permanent 
10. This breakdown is not possible in the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  193 
residence in fiscal years 1972-95  (U.S. Department of Justice 1997).IL  The 
population  covered by the data sets consists of  all persons admitted to 
permanent residence during the fiscal year, including both new arrivals in 
the United States and persons adjusting their status to permanent resi- 
dence from some other legal temporary or illegal status, except persons 
who became permanent residents through the two Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA) legalization programs (section 245(a) and special 
agricultural worker [SAW]).12  The data sets include information on the 
immigrant's  age, sex, country of birth, visa class, and occupation-the 
single indicator of skill. For 2 of the 24 years covered by the public use 
files (fiscal years 1980 and 1981), a subset of the records is missing infor- 
mation on some variables, of which sex and occupation are pertinent to 
our analysis." 
For all years between 1972  and 1995, all new immigrant men aged 21-65 
in the INS files were assigned an income based on their reported occupa- 
tion and 1980 census mean incomes in these occupation cells. To detect 
trends in relative skills of new immigrants, it is necessary to have a com- 
parison group in each year. The 1972-95  March CPS files were used to 
obtain this comparison group. From these files, a sample of men aged 
21-65  years old were selected and each was assigned an occupation-based 
income using the same occupation groupings as in the INSL4 
The occupational earnings for all new immigrants and all CPS men aged 
21-65  are presented in figure 5.1A. The CPS income series is straightfor- 
ward to describe. With the exception of a discrete downward jump in the 
series between 1982 and 1983, the trend consists of a small but steady rise 
in CPS male occupation incomes. The timing of the jump is also easy to 
explain-between  1982 and 1983, CPS switched from the 1970 to the 1980 
census  occupation  coding system. This  change represented  one of the 
largest revisions ever undertaken by the census in their occupational cod- 
ing. While we have attempted to make the coding systems as comparable 
as possible, strict comparability is simply not attainable.I5  This noncompa- 
11. Until 1976, the fiscal year started on 1  July of the preceding year and ended on 30 June; 
starting in 1977, the fiscal year runs from  1 October of the preceding year to 30 September. 
12. INS public use immigrant data files exclude IRCA-legalized persons. IRCA-based ad- 
justments to permanent resident status started in fiscal year 1989, peaked in fiscal year 1991 
(over  1 million), and continue at a trickle (e.g., 4,267 in fiscal year 1995). Total IRCA-based 
adjustments to permanent residence, through fiscal year 1996, number 2,684,892, of whom 
59 percent are section 245(a) cases (US. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996). 
13. Approximately one-fifth of the records have missing data. For example, among immi- 
grants aged 21-65  admitted with spouse-of-citizen visas, information on sex and occupation 
is missing for 17.4  percent in fiscal year 1980 and 22.8 percent in fiscal year 1981.  In addition, 
one-third of the records are missing for fiscal year 1988 (see n. 28). 
14. Nativity is not available for most of the CPS years. While it is unlikely that the aggre- 
gate trends would be affected by  the inclusion of immigrants in the CPS files, we also com- 
puted a series for non-Hispanic men (a variable that is available in all CPS years). Although 
the level of the income series for non-Hispanic men is somewhat higher, the time-series trend 
is identical to that described in the text for all CPS men. 
15. For details of the changes, see U.S. Department of Commerce (1989). 194  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
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Fig. 5.1  Average occupational income of men 21-65,  by year, for US. natives and 
all immigrants: A,  actual; B, revised 
rability produces about a $250 downward shift in the CPS series between 
1982 and 1983 and will lead to discrete shifts in the INS income series as 
well. Putting aside this complication, we  see that incomes of the all-male 
comparison group rise very slowly across these two decades. 
This stability in the CPS series stands in sharp contrast to the volatility 
in the INS income trends for all immigrants. While the INS and CPS in- The Changing Skill of New  Immigrants to the United States  195 
come series start out about the same,16  the INS immigrant series is far less 
stable and undergoes a pronounced downward shift between 1977 and the 
rnid-1980~.’~  Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the trend reverses and 
the  1990s witness rising occupation-based incomes of immigrants both 
absolute and relative to the U.S.  male working population.  Instead of 
declining relative quality of immigrants, the decade of the 1990s is more 
correctly  described  as  one  of  rising  relative immigrant  quality. These 
trends in the earnings of new immigrants do not appear to be sensitive to 
the choice of census year used to construct the occupational earnings in- 
dex. Figure 5A.1 in the appendix depicts the occupational earnings of the 
new  immigrants using both the index based on the 1980 census and an 
alternate index based on the 1990 census. Both series show the downward 
shift as well as the trend reversal, with the movements slightly more pro- 
nounced in the 1990-based series. Either of the two INS occupation in- 
come series also demonstrates that the two census years within its time 
span-  1979 and 1989-provide  a decidedly unrepresentative portrait of 
secular trends. The census and INS data do not conflict in their descrip- 
tion using these two years-both  show a dramatic quality decline. But 
these years clearly maximize the decline and obviously miss the subse- 
quent recovery. 
It has been well  documented that even recent immigrants  are a very 
heterogeneous population across many dimensions-income,  schooling, 
and country of origin, to name just a few. A less appreciated-but  perhaps 
more fundamental-manner  in which immigrants differ involves the visa 
categories under which they are admitted. Even if we ignore the impact of 
trends in illegal immigrants that confound most household surveys, trends 
in the numbers and characteristics of legal immigrants are an uncertain 
amalgam of a set of diverse but specific immigration visa categories and 
the rules and behaviors that are associated with them. The type and num- 
ber of new immigrants admitted in any year reflect policy decisions about 
such disparate subjects as refugees, diversity immigrants, family reunifica- 
tion,  and needed  “skills.” Trends  in  the types  of  immigrants  admitted 
within these quite disparate categories may reinforce each other during 
some time periods but counteract each other at other times. Understand- 
ing what drives the aggregate trends requires understanding the important 
subcategories that make up the yearly totals. 
The heterogeneity of the categories can be most simply illustrated by 
subtracting from our aggregate time-series immigrant trend a single cate- 
gory of immigrants-refugees  and asylees. Decisions about the number 
and types of refugees and asylees admitted are mostly not economic, but 
16. The fact that the series for immigrants and all men are closer than census data would 
17. Note the downward jump in the INS series between  1982 and 1983, a consequence 
suggest may partly reflect the exclusion of illegal immigrants from the INS data. 
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a reaction instead to political crises elsewhere and our sense of responsibil- 
ity to the affected groups. The influx of Vietnamese immigrants after the 
end of the Vietnam War and Russian immigrants with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union  are but  two of  the more prominent  recent  examples. No 
doubt, other crises will develop in the future in  some part of the world 
and some new  mix of refugees will  arrive. Consequently,  trends  in the 
numbers and “quality” of refugee immigrants are quite episodic in nature 
and do not reflect long-run trends in nonrefugee U.S. immigration policy, 
the primary focus of our paper. For this reason, figure 5.2 plots income 
trends for nonrefugee immigrants. 
The occupation income series for nonrefugee immigrants in figure 5.2A 
differs from that depicted in figure 5.1A in that immigrant  incomes are 
higher and thus immigrant incomes now exceed those obtained in the CPS 
by even more. This reflects the fact that, on average, refugees are relatively 
low-skilled and low-income immigrants. They are certainly not typical of 
the combined family- and employment-based immigrants. In this revised 
series, there are some sharp year-to-year swings during the mid- to late 
1970s, with a particularly sharp drop between 1977 and 1978. Nonetheless, 
this revised series that excludes refugees also indicates a rise in the “qual- 
ity” of new immigrants during the 1990s. 
Figures 5.1A and 5.2A actually overstate the differences between  the 
labor market quality of native born and immigrant workers. As mentioned 
above, there is a downward jump in these series beginning in  1982 that 
is solely due to changes in census occupational coding. One method  of 
eliminating this problem is to force the 1982 incomes to be equal to those 
in  1983 for both immigrants  and native-born  workers  alike. With these 
adjusted figures (figs. 5.1B and 5.2B), the quality of legal male immigrants 
appears to be either equal to or above that of native-born male workers 
for most of the last 25 years. This is especially so if the very special case 
of refugees are taken out of the comparison, as in figure 5.2. Legal im- 
migrant labor market quality may have been declining during the  1970s 
and early 1980s, but this decline started when the labor market quality of 
legal immigrants was most likely above that of native-born workers. At no 
point during this period of decline did the labor market quality of male 
immigrants  dip significantly  and persistently  below that  of native-born 
workers. 
5.2.3  Occupational Earnings of Recent Immigrants 
in the Current Population Survey, 1994-97 
Some confirmation of the recent trends documented in the INS surveys 
about the rising quality of immigrants can be obtained from the March 
CPS files for the years 1994-97.  Starting in 1994, the Current Population 
Surveys incorporated a number of changes that made these surveys much 
more useful for immigrant research. In particular,  questions were added 
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immigrants excluding refugees: A,  actual; B, revised 
Average occupational income of men 21-65, by  year, for U.S. natives and 
While containing much  smaller sample sizes than the decennial census 
files, these recent  CPS innovations  make that  data much  more  useful. 
Table  5.3 lists  occupation-based  incomes  for  recent  male  immigrants 
aged 21-65  in these four CPS years. These occupation-based incomes were 
based on the same categories (and 1980 mean incomes) used to predict 
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Table 5.3  Average Occupation Income, 1994-97 CPS (Recent Immigrants) 
CPS Year 
Years since 
Immigration  1994  1995  1996  1997 
All  18,467  18,661  18,751  19,028 
1994-current  n.a.  n.a.  19,375  19,156 
1992-93  n.a.  n.a.  18,634  18,832 
1992kurrent  18,740  18,853  n.a. 
1990-91  18,608  18,408  18,307 
1988-89  18,168 
N  1,096  845  807  739 
in INS data, male immigrant incomes (and hence their quality) rose stead- 
ily from 1994 to 1997. 
Supporting evidence for the rising quality of  recent immigrants is also 
obtained from the fact that more-recent immigrants in any cross section 
have higher incomes than those who arrived a few years earlier. It turns 
out that while for most  of the last decade economists have been  high- 
lighting the issue of the declining quality of recent immigrants, the quality 
of new male immigrants has actually been rising.  l8 
5.3  US. Immigration Law Regimes 
To understand the trends and changes in the numbers and skills of new 
immigrants in the period  1972-95,  it is necessary to also understand the 
features of and changes in U.S. immigration laws. This period lies in the 
era  of  worldwide  numerical  restriction,  four years  having  passed  since 
the Western Hemisphere was brought under the restriction umbrella. For 
the whole of this period, immigrant visas were allocated under the two- 
pronged system consisting of numerically unlimited visas for the immedi- 
ate relatives of U.S. citizens (defined as the spouses, minor children, and 
parents of adult U.S. citizens) and numerically limited visas for other pro- 
spective immigrants. Rules for allocating numerically limited visas, how- 
ever, changed during the period, as did rules for spouse immigrants; and 
other legislation produced additional alterations in the law regime. In this 
section, we briefly describe the major regime changes during the period. 
5.3.1 
At the start of the period, in 1972, the ceilings on numerically restricted 
visas  were  170,000 for  natives  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  (EH)  and 
120,000 for natives  of the Western  Hemisphere  (WH); and numerically 
Regime Changes in Allocation of Numerically Restricted Visas 
18. Additional evidence that immigrant skills have turned upward is found in Funkhouser 
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restricted visas were allocated in two distinct ways, according to hemi- 
sphere of origin. For natives of EH countries, the law prescribed a system 
of preference categories, with country ceilings; the preference categories 
included four family-based categories, two employment-based categories, 
a refugee category, and a nonpreference (or residual) category. Each in- 
dependent country had a 20,000 annual limit. For natives of the Western 
Hemisphere, there were no country ceilings, and visas were allocated on a 
first-come, first-served basis, with some employment or asset screening. 
Legislation enacted in 1976, effective in 1977, extended the preference- 
category system and country ceilings to the Western Hemisphere. Initially, 
each hemisphere retained its own separate ceiling (170,000 for the Eastern 
Hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western). Legislation enacted in  1978, 
however, brought both hemispheres under a single worldwide numerical 
ceiling of 290,000 (exclusive of immediate relatives, refugees, and other 
special immigrants), effective in fiscal year 1979. Subsequently, the Refu- 
gee Act of  1980 removed refugees from the preference-category system 
and reduced the worldwide ceiling to 270,000, effective in  1981 (with a 
transition ceiling of 280,000 in fiscal year 1980). 
The two employment categories under the 1965-90  preference-category 
system were the third preference category, designated  for “members of 
the professions of exceptional ability,” and the sixth preference category, 
designated for “workers in skilled or unskilled occupations in which labor- 
ers are in short supply in the United States,” plus, in both cases, the princi- 
pals’ spouses and minor children. The maximum number of visas allocated 
to each category was 10 percent of the overall ceiling. Thus, in the years 
before the worldwide ceiling was established, the ceilings for all occupa- 
tion-based visas were 34,000 in the Eastern Hemisphere (a continuation 
of their existing limit) and 24,000 in the Western Hemisphere. In  1979, 
the worldwide ceiling for these visas was the combined total of 58,000, 
and in  1981 it was reduced to 54,000 (20 percent of the new worldwide 
ceiling of 270,000). 
The preference-category system itself was radically restructured again 
by the Immigration Act of 1990, effective in October 1991. Especially rele- 
vant to the analysis in this paper was a triple shift in employment-based 
visas. First, the total number of employment-based visas available to quali- 
fied persons plus their accompanying family members was increased from 
54,000 under the old law to 120,120-more  than a twofold increase.19  Sec- 
ond, employment-based visas were made available to multinational execu- 
19. Under the 1990 act, the number of employment-based visas is 140,000;  of this number, 
however, only 120,120 are for the first three employment preferences, which are the catego- 
ries corresponding to the old system’s employment preference categories. The fourth and 
fifth employment preference categories in the new law cover a subset of the special immigrant 
class, which was numerically unlimited in the old law, plus several new classes (U.S. Depart- 
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tives. Third, the maximum number of employment-based visas available 
to unskilled principals plus accompanying family members was reduced 
from 27,000 to 10,OO-a  63 percent reduction.20 
Of the changes within each preference-category system, one is pertinent 
to an analysis of skill levels, and that is the legislative provision that se- 
verely restricted the granting of employment-based visas to foreign phy- 
sicians. Under the provisions of the Act of 12 October 1976, effective 10 
January  1977, physicians are now required to have passed parts I and I1 
of the National Board of Medical Examiners examination as a condition 
of eligibility for an employment-based visa.” 
5.3.2  Regime Changes in Allocation of Numerically 
Unrestricted Visas to Spouses of U.S. Citizens 
For the entire period under study, U.S. citizens (of both  sexes) were 
entitled to sponsor the immigration of their foreign spouses outside the 
numerical  limitations.  The steep increase in  the number  of immigrants 
admitted  as spouses  of  U.S. citizens  (hereafter  simply  “spouse  immi- 
grants”)-from  25,000 in  1965 to 55,620 in  1975 and 124,093 in  1985- 
coupled with a suspicion that at least a portion of spouse-immigrant cases 
were the result of fraudulent marriages, led to enactment of the Immigra- 
tion Marriage Fraud Amendments in 1986. The 1986 amendments stipu- 
late that spouse immigrants married less than two years receive a condi- 
tional visa; to remove the conditional status, such immigrants must apply 
to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization  Service in the 90-day period 
preceding the second anniversary of their having been admitted to condi- 
tional immigrant status. 
5.3.3 
At the start of the period under study, persons who had lived illegally in 
the United States since 1948 could petition for adjustment to permanent 
resident status under the so-called registry provision. During the decade 
of the 1970s, concern increased that there was a large and growing popula- 
tion of illegal aliens. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
enacted in 1986, updated the registry date to 1972 and provided two major 
legalization programs: (1) a two-phase legalization program for persons 
who had resided continuously in the United States since before 1982 in an 
Other Changes in the Immigration Law Regime 
20. The old law’s sixth preference category allowed 27,000 visas to both skilled and un- 
skilled workers in short supply (and accompanying family members). Under the new law, the 
unskilled portion is allowed 10,000. Thus, under the old law, the maximum number of visas 
for unskilled workers would be 27,000, in the case where no skilled workers applied. 
21. See Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) for a description of pertinent provisions of the 1976 
legislation as well as follow-up legislation, which exempts from the examination requirement 
physicians who were already practicing in the United States in a nonimmigrant status as of 
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illegal status (the section 245(a) legalizations); and (2) a legalization pro- 
gram  for two groups of  special  agricultural workers (SAWS) who had 
worked in U.S. agriculture for specified durations in the years 1984-86.” 
The application periods for the two legalization programs were from May 
1987 to May 1988 for the pre-I982 applicants and from June 1987 to No- 
vember 1988 for the SAW applicants (though there were late filings). 
During the legalization application period and in  its aftermath,  two 
things  came  to be widely believed: (1) that  only a fraction  of  section 
245(a)-eligible aliens came forward, either for fear of the authorities or 
through inability to pay the processing fees; and (2) that only a fraction 
of the SAW-legalized aliens had actually worked in agriculture. Evidence 
in support of the first notion includes the large number of petitions filed 
by legalized aliens, after adjusting to permanent resident status, to spon- 
sor their spouses and children.23  As for the second notion, evidence from 
the  National  Agricultural  Worker  Surveys, which  have  failed  to  find 
sufficient SAW-legalized individuals currently working in agriculture, sug- 
gests that SAW-legalized persons have left agriculture, if  not the United 
States (Mines, Gabbard, and Steirman 1997). 
There were two other changes in the immigration law regime pertinent 
to analyses of spouse immigrants. First, IRCA-legalized aliens started be- 
coming eligible to naturalize in 1994. Thus, spouses and minor children 
currently in the numerically limited family second preference visa backlogs 
would shift to spouses and children of  U.S. citizens, introducing to the 
spouse-of-citizen flow a new segment, starting in fiscal year 1995. Second, 
the 1990 act instituted more stringent provisions on sponsorship of immi- 
grants, and these became a contractual obligation in 1996, under provi- 
sions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia- 
tion Act  of  1996 and the Illegal Immigration  Reform  and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996. 
Finally, there were two major changes in the rules by which foreign-born 
persons who are eligible for permanent residence and who are already in 
the United States may adjust their visa status. First, the same law that 
extended the preference-category system to the Western Hemisphere in 
1977 also extended to WH immigrants the right to adjust status in the 
United  States (without returning to their  origin country first). Second, 
legislation enacted in 1995 made it possible for persons eligible for perma- 
nent residence but living illegally in the United States to also adjust their 
status without leaving the country (with payment of a penalty fee). 
22. For simplicity, the section 245(a) cases will be referred to as “pre-1982” cases. 
23. The surge in applications led to enlarged visa backlogs in the family second preference 
category (which covers the spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens) and to 
special legislation desgined to provide relief, such as the three-year legalization dependents 
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5.4  Immigration Law Regimes and Individual Behavior 
In this section we describe the expected effects of the major changes in 
the immigration law regimes that have occurred in the past 25 years on 
spouse immigrants and, for contrast, on employment-immigrant  princi- 
pals. To understand the strategic behavior of immigrants, these two immi- 
grant categories stand out. For the vast majority of the world’s population 
who are not candidates for admission to America, because they do not 
have an existing relative there, these are the only two legal ways to obtain 
permanent residence. In general, there are both direct and indirect effects 
of  law changes  on immigration  flows. The direction  of  direct effects is 
evident from the provision of law. The direction of indirect effects, how- 
ever, depends on behavioral responses to the new regime and, in the case 
of effects on average skill, on differences in the skill configuration between 
particular pools of prospective immigrants. 
Our discussion  of how immigration  law changes may  affect the skill 
composition of immigrants is based on a few simple assumptions. To illus- 
trate, let  there  be  two  categories  of  legal  immigrants  (the unrestricted 
group of spouses of U.S. citizens, N,, and the numerically  restricted  em- 
ployment immigrants, N,, and one group of illegal immigrants (N,).24  The 
total number of legal immigrants in any year is N, + N, = T legal, while the 
total  number  of immigrants  equals  N, + N,+  N, = Total.  Using S to 
index the average skill of a given type of immigrant, the average skill of 
all immigrants can be expressed as a weighted average of the skill of the 
within-group categories: 
for average skill of legal immigrants; 
(2)  S,,,,,  = (Ny/Total)Si + (Ni/Total)S, + (N!/Total)? 
for average skill of all immigrants. 
To give some content to these expressions, we assume first that S, > S, 
> S,. This ordering follows because the employment visa categories that 
screen for skills have a more stringent labor-market-skill threshold  than 
does the spouse category, which in turn has more stringent skill screening 
than does immigration without any visa (illegal immigration). A prospec- 
tive immigrant without relatives (siblings, parents, adult children) in the 
United States faces less-stringent employment skill screening by prospec- 
tive U.S. mates than via the employment visa route to immigration  be- 
cause, for example, charm, looks, and cooking skills may be less rewarded 
in the labor market  than in the marriage market and can make up for 
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deficient earning abilities. Thus, finding a job match that provides a visa 
is more costly compared with finding a marital match, the lower the pro- 
spective immigrant’s skill level. 
Secondly, we  assume that within policy regimes the number of employ- 
ment visas (N,)  are fixed, while the number of spouse and illegal immigrant 
flows are free. Prospective immigrants will  select the least-cost route to 
immigration, inducing substitution between these categories as the legal 
regimes shift or as economic conditions in the United States or in the 
sending countries vary. The skill distributions of the immigrant categories 
overlap, and movement between groups on average is from bottom to top 
(going downward) and from top to bottom (going upward). This ordering 
is reasonable, since the prospective immigrants most likely to move be- 
tween groups are those where the skill overlap between the groups is great- 
est. For example, if there is an increase in the number of illegal immigrants 
(due to lower enforcement  at the border),  the spouse immigrants who 
move into the illegal category will be the least skilled among the spouse 
immigrants. Similarly, if there is an increase in the number of employment 
visas available, the spouses who now obtain employment visas on average 
will be the most skilled (i.e., the most likely to qualify in the employment 
category) among the spousal immigrants. 
This framework implies that there will  be two effects of  any regime 
change. The first is a composition effect as the relative weights of immi- 
grant categories change. For example, increasing the weight of the employ- 
ment category will tend to increase the average quality of both legal and 
total immigrant flows. Similarly, an increase in the relative weight of the 
illegal immigrants category will  reduce the average quality of  all immi- 
grants. It may, however, increase the average quality of legal immigrants if 
some of the low-skill spouse immigrants shift into the illegal category. The 
second effect of any regime change relates to any within-group alteration 
in average skill. Our assumptions imply that the skill levels of husband 
immigrants will be less than those of employment (principal) immigrants 
on average, as we  see in the data, and greater than those of illegal immi- 
grants.  Moreover,  allowing more  illegal  immigration  (which  does  not 
screen for skills) would lead to a shift of higher-skill prospective immi- 
grants out from the marriage route, thus raising the skill level of marital 
immigrants, while increasing the number of high-skill visas would lower 
the average skill of the marital immigrants. This latter indirect substitution 
effect reduces the overall effect of increasing the number of high-skill visas 
to the extent that those who would have become immigrants via marriage 
now do so with an employment visa. 
We now use these assumptions to discuss how each of the major specific 
immigration  law  regime changes  that  occurred  in  the  period  1972-95 
might have affected the numbers and average skill of  yearly immigrant 
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number and skill composition of marital immigrants and the skill compo- 
sition of employment immigrants. We do not discuss or examine in detail 
how these law changes affect the numbers of employment principals be- 
cause the numerical ceilings in this category were usually binding in the 
years before the 1990 act, so that, aside from direct effects on the ceilings 
dictated by law,  the only possible  kind of effect on the number  of male 
employment principals would be due to shifts in sex composition. 
5.4.1  Application of the Preference-Category System to 
the Western Hemisphere (Since Midyear 1977) 
By  far, the most complicated  change  involves  the integration  of  the 
Western Hemisphere into the worldwide preference-category system. The 
complications stem in part from the possible differential impacts on each 
hemisphere,  subsequent  changes  in  the  integration  rules,  and different 
treatment of low-skill and high-skill employment visa categories.  Before 
integration,  there were no employment visa preference  categories in the 
Western Hemisphere, while the Eastern Hemisphere operated under a to- 
tal limit of 34,000, divided equally between third and sixth preference vi- 
sas. In  1977 and  1978, a total ceiling of 24,000 was put in place  in the 
Western Hemisphere (once again, equal division between third and sixth 
preferences), but there were no changes in the Eastern Hemisphere. Start- 
ing in 1979, the two hemispheres were placed under a single limit, initially 
of  58,000, falling to 56,000 in  1980 and then becoming fixed at 54,000 
thereafter. As before, each of those limits were divided equally between the 
high- and low-skill preference visas. Since the pre-1979 within-hemisphere 
limits on employment visas may have been more binding on the Eastern 
Hemisphere, the adoption in  1981 of a common limit could result in an 
effective increase in the number of Eastern Hemisphere employment visas. 
These changes also had an impact on the two main preference catego- 
ries within the employment  visas. As described above, third preference 
visas are for relatively skilled persons and sixth preference visas are for 
less-skilled persons. While the post-1981 limits were 27,000 in both third 
and sixth preferences, there was a much higher demand for third prefer- 
ence visas in the Eastern Hemisphere and a higher demand for the less- 
skilled sixth preference visas in the Western Hemisphere. 
Spouses of  US.  Citizens 
Bringing thc Western Hemisphere under the preference-category system 
for allocating numerically limited visas would of course not directly affect 
the  spouse  immigrants.  However, via  behavioral  (substitution)  mecha- 
nisms, WH individuals who previously would have been admitted under 
the first-come first-served with  modified screening regime and who now 
found themsclves without a relative or employer sponsor would become 
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diately be an increase in the number of spouse immigrants from the West- 
ern Hemisphere. Given that prior to this law change, the WH immigrants 
underwent some job screening, we would expect that the numerically lim- 
ited old-regime WH immigrants had higher skills than spouse immigrants. 
Accordingly, we  would expect that introducing a new flow  of previous 
numerically limited old-regime immigrants into the spouse pool would in- 
crease the average skill level of the WH spouse immigrants. In the Eastern 
Hemisphere, enlargement of the employment visa allotment due to impo- 
sition of a worldwide ceiling in 1979 would reduce pressure on the spouse 
category, inducing a shift from the spouse route to the employment route. 
Because dual-eligibles would be more skilled than spouses, we would ex- 
pect a reduction in the average skill level of the EH husband immigrants. 
Employment Principals 
A direct effect of this law change would be to increase the number of 
employment principals. Its effect on the skill of employment immigrant 
principals would depend on whether the “new” WH employment immi- 
grants have higher or lower skills than their EH counterparts. Previous 
theory and research both indicate the operation of distance as a selection 
mechanism, and, thus, we would expect that the WH employment princi- 
pals would be less skilled than the EH employment principals and, there- 
fore, that the effect of the WH law change would be to reduce the skill 
level of employment principals. Moreover, EH immigrants shifting from 
the spouse category to the employment category in response to the en- 
larged visa pool would be of lower average skill than the well-screened 
EH employment immigrants who had not contemplated the spouse route. 
Thus, the average skill of employment immigrants should decrease. 
5.4.2  Restricting Employment-Based Visas for Physicians (1978) 
Relative to the total number of visas, the number of physician employ- 
ment visas issued before the law change was modest, and hence its decline 
in numbers would also be modest. For example, the number of physicians 
admitted with employment visas hovered around 2,000 in 1976 and 1977, 
declining to about 1,000 in 1978 and to 623 in  1979. Therefore, this law 
change should have relatively little effect on the total number of employ- 
ment or spouse visas issued. The major impact stems instead from the 
changing within-group immigrant quality, which should lower average im- 
migrant quality. 
Employment Principals 
Since the  skill and incomes of  physician  visa  immigrants  are much 
higher than those of other employment visa immigrants, the physician 
restriction should have a sharp direct negative effect on the average skill 
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visas than total legal immigrant visas, the effect on the average quality of 
employment principals should be larger than any effect in the quality of all 
legal immigrants. 
Spouses of  US.  Citizens 
Restricting the access of physicians to employment visas has no direct 
effect on the number of spouse immigrants, but it might have behavioral 
substitution effects. Physicians who are now barred from obtaining em- 
ployment visas may find the spouse route to immigration attractive, thus 
increasing the number of spouse immigrants and their average skill. How- 
ever, if the absolute number of individuals involved is small, then these 
effects may not be noticeable. 
5.4.3  IRCA Legalization Programs 
Because they deal explicitly with the illegal population, the IRCA legal- 
ization programs do not directly affect either employment or spouse immi- 
grants. But IRCA may have had indirect effects on both, by providing an 
easier route to legal immigration for both potential spouse and employ- 
ment immigrants. The nature of these indirect effects would depend on 
the extent to which the IRCA, employment, and husband pools overlap 
and on the differences between overlapping segments of the pools. 
Spouses of US.  Citizens 
To the extent that IRCA-eligibles are relieved of the obligation to meet 
stringent job screening, the IRCA programs would reduce the number of 
spouse immigrants. The direct composition effect then is to increase the 
average quality of non-IRCA legal  immigrant^.^^ Whether the TRCA pro- 
grams increased or decreased the average skill of the spouse immigrants 
would depend on the skill of the IRCA-eligibles relative to the spouse 
pool. In general, the registry and pre-1982 resident legalized aliens would 
have had a long enough time to find a mate, and would obviously have 
been unsuccessful, implying that their skill level was lower than that of 
other potential mates for US. citizen women. The SAW-legalized aliens, 
on the other hand, might have included interesting, productive, higher- 
skilled individuals who, with some chutzpah, saw the program as an op- 
portunity to enter the United States, merely by  working, or claiming to 
have worked, a few months in agriculture. If the dual-eligibles were supe- 
rior to those only eligible for the spouse route, then the IRCA program, 
which would siphon them off, would reduce the average skill of spouse 
immigrants.  Moreover,  if  higher-skilled  husband-eligibles  found  the 
United  States less  attractive because  of the legalization program,  then 
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their dropping out of the husband pool would reduce the average skill of 
husband immigrants. 
Employment Principals 
The effect of IRCA on the average skill of employment principals is 
likely to be negligible, as it is unlikely that low-skill IRCA-eligible immi- 
grants were eligible for employment visas and represented in the backlogs 
in this visa category. 
5.4.4  Marriage Fraud Restriction 
Marriage fraud provisions reduced the number of immigrants coming 
under spouse visas. Since spouse visa immigrants are less skilled than em- 
ployment visa immigrants, the direct composition effect is to increase the 
average quality  of  legal immigrant flows. The effect on total immigrant 
flows is muted as some of the now deterred marriages will  probably in- 
crease illegal immigrant flows. There are indirect within-group effects as 
well. 
Spouses of  US.  Citizens 
The marriage  fraud provisions were directed  at reducing and should 
unambiguously  reduce, the number  of  spouse immigrants. Some of the 
now deterred, more-skilled marriage visa types can try to compete for the 
still numerically limited employment visas, reducing the average quality of 
spouse visas. Some of the now deterred, less-skilled marriage visa types 
can branch into the illegal group, which has no explicit numerical limita- 
tion, thus increasing the average quality of spouse visas. 
Employment Principals 
The marriage fraud provisions, of course, have no direct effect on the 
number of employment immigrants (which are still numerically fixed), but 
they may have an indirect effect on skill composition due to substitution. 
Prior to screening for fraud, a less-skilled immigrant selects the marital 
route over the employment route. With the marital route costs now higher, 
some of these lower-skill spouse immigrants would seek employment visas, 
thus lowering the average skill level of the latter category. The effect of 
using an employment visa rather than a marriage visa would be to reduce 
the average skill of employment immigrants. 
5.4.5 
The final regime change concerns the 1990 act, which had two impor- 
tant direct effects-significantly  increasing the total number of  employ- 
ment visas issued, while at the same time reducing the number of unskilled 
employment visas. By assigning higher weight to the relatively high-skilled 
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employment visa categories, the direct compositional effect is to increase 
the average quality of all legal immigrant and total immigrant flows. In 
addition, this regime change may have implications due to behavioral sub- 
stitution effects for flows between categories as well as for within-category 
immigrant quality. 
Employment Principals 
The 1990 act dramatically  increased the number  of visas available to 
skilled employment  immigrants,  and  equally  dramatically  reduced  the 
number available to unskilled individuals; it also made visas available to 
multinational executives. The  1990 act should then unambiguously  in- 
crease the average skill level of employment principals. If we  distinguish 
between the higher- and lower-skilled subsets of employment principals, 
then average skill in the higher-skilled subset would increase due to the 
introduction of multinational executives, while average skill in the lower- 
skilled subset would increase only  if  unskilled persons had  dominated 
the category. 
Spouses of  US. Citizens 
The more indirect  behavioral effects involve the implications  for the 
number and type of spouse visas. Increasing the number of employment 
visas available should generally reduce the pressure on the spouse route; 
however, reducing the number of employment visas available for unskilled 
persons should put pressure on the spouse route. It is an empirical ques- 
tion whether, on net, the change in the employment visa allotment in- 
creases or decreases the number of spouse immigrants. The skill level of 
spouse immigrants should, however, unambiguously decline, as there is a 
net outflow to the employment visa category of skilled spouses but a net 
inflow into the spouse visa category of low-skilled employment visas. 
To illustrate the effects of the law changes on the numbers of immigrants 
in the spouse and employment visa categories, we  briefly describe their 
time-series trends. Figure 5.3 plots the numbers of male employment prin- 
cipal immigrants for the years  1972-95,  a category, as noted, that has a 
series of overall binding numerical ceilings. The shape of this plot is thus 
almost wholly explained by law changes and processing of visas. Although 
there exist smaller cyclic swings in this series,2h  its principal characteristics 
are a discrete 50 percent jump in the series between 198 1 and 1982 and an 
even larger (more than two-fold) jump between 1991 and 1992. Both of 
these changes are the direct consequence of  law changes. The  1981-82 
shift reflects the impact  of the extension of  the employment preference 
26. Although the total numbers of employment visas are fixed within regime, the numbers 
of male employment visas are not. The Changing Skill of New  Immigrants to the United States  209 
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Fig. 5.3  Number of employment principal men 21-65,  by year 
system to the WH countries. This integration of the Eastern and Western 
Hemispheres under the same set of rules led to an increase in the total 
numbers of employment visas allowed. Bringing both hemispheres under 
a single worldwide ceiling starting in  1980 would result in having more 
visas available to EH applicants (who had a high demand for them), and 
indeed, we  observe in figure 5.3 an increase in employment  principals 
starting in 1982 (consistent with the usual processing and other delays). 
Similarly, the 1991-92  shift was the result of the increase in the number of 
employment visas allowed by legislative change. There was initially a wide 
pent-up demand for such slots. After some countries met their demand, 
the numbers of employment visas began to fall. 
Figure 5.4  plots the other main series of interest-the  numbers of male 
spouses of U.S. citizens. In contrast to the employment visa category, this 
series has no explicit numerical limits in any year, a reality that is reflected 
in the volatility of the numbers. Abstracting from the richness of detail in 
these swings in the numbers, there are two significant movements that we 
will highlight. The first is the steady, and eventually large, increase in the 
numbers of male spousal immigrants from 1981 to 1986, and the second 
is the somewhat smaller subsequent decline. The major legislative force in 
the 1981-86  upswing was most likely the placement of the Western Hemi- 
sphere under the preference categories. Potential immigrants from some 
countries were now effectively constrained, and they needed another path- 
way to become legal immigrant residents in the United States. The major 
factors in the post-1986 decline were the passage of the marriage fraud 210  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
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Fig. 5.4  Number of spouse immigrant men 21-65,  by  year 
amendments, which made such marriages more difficult, and IRCA, which 
gave some potential immigrants who would have followed the marriage 
route an alternative path to admission. 
Figure 5.5 provides a more detailed description of the changing bite of 
the numerical ceilings by plotting the number of employment visas issued 
for each hemisphere along with the sum of the two. The straight horizontal 
lines in this figure represent the ceilings that were in place in each year. 
Before 1976, employment visas (and the ceiling of 34,000) were only rele- 
vant for the Eastern Hemisphere. By  the mid 1970s, EH visas issued were 
actually below the ceiling, probably due to severe recession in the United 
States. With integration, employment visas were issued to WH countries. 
Between 1976 and 1981, there was a growth in employment visas in both 
hemispheres. In both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, the growing 
demand for employment visas did not hit the respective ceilings until 198 1. 
Figure 5.5  shows that when a single ceiling was introduced in  1981, the 
sharp jump in employment visas was much larger in the Eastern Hemi- 
sphere. EH demand  for employment visas was  far greater  than in  the 
Western Hemisphere, so that the introduction of a single ceiling resulted 
in a de facto relaxation of the EH ceiling. This differential effect between 
hemispheres suggests that the impact of these changing rules may vary 
across hemispheres. 
Figures  5.6  and  5.7  separate employment  visas  into  their  high-skill 
(third preference) and low-skill (sixth preference) components. These fig- 
ures demonstrate that the large post-1981 increase in demand in the East- 
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Fig. 5.5  Employment immigrants and ceilings, by hemisphere 
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Fig. 5.6  High-skilled employment immigrants and ceilings 
shift in the Western Hemisphere was for the low-skill sixth preference vi- 
sas. To  the extent that behavioral substitution is introduced with spouse 
visas, they are likely to be relatively high-skill EH spouses and low-skill 
WH spouses. 
Figure 5.8 plots time series in the number of spouse visas, separately by 
hemisphere and, within the Western Hemisphere, separately for Mexico 
and the rest of the hemisphere. For all three groups, there is a steady climb 
in the number of such visas following the 1976 integration. However, the 212  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
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Fig. 5.8  Spouse-of-U.S.-citizen immigrants, by hemisphere 
sharp decline in marriage visas in the mid- to late 1980s is clearly concen- 
trated in the Western Hemisphere, and within the Western Hemisphere, 
in Mexico. 
5.5  Estimating the Effects of Economic Conditions and Law Changes 
on Numbers of Immigrants and Their Skill Composition 
The annual volume of migration flows, as well as the skill selectivity of 
migrants who arrive, are not simply consequences of the specific provi- The Changing Skill of New  Immigrants to the United States  213 
sions of U.S. immigration laws. Prospective migrants decide to come or 
not based in part on a comparison of economic conditions in their home 
countries and in the United States, the costs of migration, and the psychic 
benefits and costs of living in different places. In a recent paper, we devel- 
oped a theoretical framework that identifies some of  the principal eco- 
nomic forces shaping the economic selectivity of immigrants and the gains 
they experience from migration.27 This theoretical framework identifies 
the interaction between migrant skill heterogeneity and differences in the 
valuations of skills across countries of the world as important determi- 
nants of the numbers of migrants as well as their skill selectivity. For ex- 
ample, holding  worker skill levels constant,  prospective migrants from 
countries with low skill prices (relative to the United States) have more to 
gain from migrating to the United States. Since low skill prices will enable 
even less-skilled workers to gain from migration, the model also predicts a 
positive correlation of origin-country-specific skill prices and the average 
skill of migrants from those countries. Similarly, the high costs of migra- 
tion will not only reduce the number of migrations but will also increase 
the average skill of migrants since (at any given skill price) only high-skill 
migrants will gain enough to justify the move. In summary, this theoretical 
framework argues that skill price heterogeneity across sending countries, 
differential direct migration costs, and the selective criteria of U.S. immi- 
gration laws influence not only the numbers of migrants from different 
countries but, selectively, the skill composition of those who migrate. 
5.5.1  Data and Measures 
To  assess how and whether changes in U.S.  immigration law regimes 
and country-specific economic conditions have importantly  shaped the 
changing  skill composition of  U.S.  immigrants, we  constructed origin- 
country-specific data sets for the period 1972-92  that merge information 
on the new legal immigrants from the INS data sets, information on the 
major immigration law regimes, and information on the origin-country 
characteristics  of  the immigrants.28  We  focus on two subsets  of  immi- 
grants: spouse-of-citizen immigrants  and employment-based  principals. 
The set of spouse immigrants covers all numerically unlimited immediate- 
relative spouse visas, including fianck visas and the new visas for widowed 
persons made available by the 1990 act.29  The set of employment princi- 
pals covers the principals in the old system’s third and sixth preference 
categories (for the fiscal years 1972-91)  and in the new 1990 act system’s 
27. See Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1998). 
28. We received defective data for fiscal year 1988, such that one-third of the records are 
missing. Accordingly, we  do not use fiscal year 1988 data in this paper, but we will redo all 
analyses as soon as we receive the correct data set. Moreover, given that data for fiscal years 
1980 and 1981 are irremediably incomplete, we control by defining a binary variable for those 
years (incomplete data). 
29. The visa classes included in the spouse set are as follows: IR1, IR6, IFI, MR6, CRI, 
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employment first, second, and third preference categories but, for consis- 
tency, excluding visa classes set aside for persons from particular coun- 
tries.30 
For each country of origin for each year, we obtained the average occu- 
pational earnings, constructed from the reported occupation codes as dis- 
cussed above for all male immigrants in the relevant visa category aged 
21-65.  As noted, occupation is the single indicator of  skill available in 
these data. Occupation represents the occupation reported by the immi- 
grant. If  the immigrant is obtaining a visa requiring labor certification 
(for example, if he is an employment-based principal), then the reported 
occupation is  the occupation on which the labor certification is based. 
Otherwise, occupation refers to the current or last employment in the ori- 
gin country or in the United  States. Because immigrants adjusting their 
visa status are more likely to report a U.S. occupation and to have some 
U.S. work experience, we also constructed for each country a variable in- 
dicating the proportion  of men in the visa category who adjusted their 
 tatu us.^' 
The rate of reporting an occupation has changed over time. It appears 
to be linked to adjustment of status and to the possibility that the ad- 
justing immigrant is working illegally. Visa applicants who are already in 
the United States and who are working illegally might be reluctant to pro- 
vide their occupation on the application forms. To capture trends in re- 
porting bias, we  thus constructed a variable indicating the proportion of 
the immigrants who reported an occupation. 
Country-specific skill prices are not directly observable. However, it is 
possible to infer how skill prices vary across countries with information 
on the individual earnings and schooling of workers across origin coun- 
tries and country-specific data on aggregate output, numbers of workers, 
and average schooling levels.32  With respect  to intercountry  skill price 
variation, among workers with the same schooling and residing in coun- 
tries with the same output per worker, those workers residing in countries 
30. As  noted in  official State Department  publications, the old employment categories 
correspond to the new system’s employment first, second, and third categories (U.S. Depart- 
ment of State 1992). Legislation subsequently enacted (in October 1992) provided visas for 
two country-specific groups: nationals of the People’s Republic of China who had been in 
the United  States between 4 June  1989 and  11 April  1990 (mostly students who did not 
want to return to China after the Tiananmen Square confrontation) and scientists from the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States, the visas to be drawn 
from employment second preference for the Soviet scientists and from the employment third 
preference for the Chinese students. For comparability with the employment series since 
1972, we exclude both of those groups. Accordingly, the visa classes included in the employ- 
ment principal set are as follows: P31, P36, P61, P66, Ell, E12, E13, E16, E17, E18, E21, 
E26, E31, E32, E36, E37, EW3, and EW8. 
31. There is also a variable (not reported  in tables 5.6 and 5.7) controlling for missing 
adjustment status. 
32. See Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1998) for details. The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  215 
where workers also have average skill levels will have lower skill prices and 
wages, while among workers with identical schooling levels in countries 
with the same average worker skill levels, those in countries with higher 
output per worker will have higher skill prices and observed wages. Given 
immigrant  skill heterogeneity and selectivity due to home-country skill 
price variation, these results imply that immigrants from countries with 
high (low) average levels of schooling will have the highest (lowest) skill 
levels among immigrants with identical schooling levels. 
To characterize the origin countries’ migration-relevant conditions and 
to measure skill prices, we  use their year-specific gross domestic product 
(GDP) per worker estimates from the Penn World Table, Mark 5.6, and 
estimates of the average schooling levels of the working-age population in 
origin countries from Barro and Lee (1996). These country-specific GDP 
measures were adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and expressed 
in  1985 U.S.  dollars.  The series we  use  omits some countries (notably 
China, Vietnam, Cuba, and countries of the former Soviet Union). Since 
the theoretical  model is symmetric in terms of  attributes of destination 
and origin countries, our models also include variables measuring time- 
series variation in GDP per worker and average schooling per worker in 
the United States. 
Table 5.4  provides descriptive statistics for the data sets constructed. 
Consistent with our assumption about differential screening, the table in- 
dicates that, over the period, the average earnings of the husband immi- 
grants, as measured by the occupational income measure, were about 22 
percent less than those of all employment principal men, and almost 30 
percent less than those of principal immigrant men in the high-skill visa 
category and less as well, by  7 percent, than those for low-skill employ- 
ment immigrants. Some of this difference may be due to age, as the average 
age of the employment immigrants is over five years more (15 percent) 
than that of the husband immigrants. In addition, a considerably higher 
proportion of the high-skill employment immigrants adjusted status-66 
percent compared with 39 percent for the husband immigrants-so  the 
former group may have more U.S. labor market experience. Not surpris- 
ing, almost all of the employment immigrants report an occupation, while 
on average 77 percent of the husband immigrants do so. Finally, over the 
period, employment immigrants came from larger countries with a higher 
mean per capita GDP than did the husband immigrants. 
5.5.2  Estimation Procedure 
Based on the constructed country data set, we  estimate the determin- 
ants of the country- and year-specific number (per origin country popula- 
tion) and average occupational earnings of  immigrant men aged 21-65 
who entered by  marrying U.S.  citizens. We  also estimate the determin- 
ants of  the average occupational earnings of similarly aged men in the Table 5.4  Characteristics of Legal Male Immigrants Aged 2145, by  Visa Category: 1972-92 
Variable 
Principal Men with Employment Visas 
Husbands of 
U.S. Citizens  All  High Skill  Low Skill 
Mean occupational income (1979 US$) 
Mean age 
Proportion adjusting status 
Proportion reporting an occupation 
Mean per capita PPP GDP (1985 US$) of country 
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employment visa category, stratified by high- and low-skill immigrants; as 
discussed above, in these employment regressions, the WH observations 
start in  1977. The regressors include GDP and  average schooling per 
worker for the origin country and the United States, and the law-regime 
factors discussed above depicted by  sets of dummy variables correspond- 
ing to the different regimes. We also include in the specification a cohort 
term designed to capture a linear time trend and, in the occupational earn- 
ings equations, a variable measuring  the proportion  of immigrants  re- 
porting  an  ~ccupation.~~  The  specification  also  includes country  fixed 
effects, to pick up such time-invariant factors as distance of the country 
from the United  States, language, and unmeasured cultural factors that 
may affect skill levels of immigrants by country. 
In an earlier section, we  described in detail the major shifts in U.S. im- 
migration law regimes. Identification of these regime shifts in our statisti- 
cal model can only flow from calendar year shifts in the underlying rela- 
tionship. It would be useful to be able to formulate and implement a sharp 
characterization of the law regimes. However, two factors conspire against 
such a characterization:  First, important law  changes sometimes occur 
together, such as (1) worldwide visa allocation integration and physician 
restriction, and (2) IRCA legalization and the marriage fraud restrictions. 
Second, defective data for three years-fiscal  years 1980, 1981, 1988, the 
first two of which are beyond repair-make  it necessary to exclude the 
fiscal year 1988 observations altogether and to define a dummy variable 
for the 1980 and 1981 years, thus hampering identification of more precise 
law-regime effects. Fortunately, the coincident regime shifts should have 
similar effects. Therefore, we  characterize the law  regimes and estimate 
their  effects with two main  binary variables: (1) integration  of the two 
hemispheres into a single worldwide visa allocation system, including the 
physician restriction provision, equal to one if the year is fiscal year 1977 
or later; and (2) IRCA legalization and marriage fraud restriction, equal 
to one if the year is fiscal year 1987 or later. Each of these variables is de- 
fined for one or both hemispheres, as appropriate. For example, in the em- 
ployment regressions, in which WH observations begin in fiscal year 1977 
(when the preference-category system was extended to the Western Hemi- 
sphere), the worldwide integration variable is defined only for the East- 
ern Hemisphere; in the marriage regressions, however, this same variable 
is defined for both hemispheres. 
The data series on the size of the workforce in sending countries is only 
available up to 1990. Therefore, it is not possible to test for the effect of 
changes in the 1990 act simultaneously with country-of-origin economic 
33. Consistent with our discussion above of occupation coding, the skill equation also 
includes a dummy for the years when the INS coded occupation using the  1960 or 1970 
census detailed occupational classifications (fiscal years 1972-82). 218  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
Table 5.5  Average Occupational Income among Spouse and Employment 
Principal Immigrants before and after the 1990 Act: Men Aged 21-65 
Cohort 
Hemisphere of  Origin  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Spouses of U.S. citizens 
Eastern Hemisphere  20,355  20,613  20,661  20,706 
Western Hemisphere  17,868  18,092  18,043  17,572 
Eastern Hemisphere  23,006  23,483  24,043  24,152 
Western Hemisphere  20,599  19,179  2 1,469  21,802 
Employment principals 
Note; The 1990 act took effect at the start of fiscal year 1992. 
conditions. Fortunately, the changes induced by the 1990 act are so large 
that its main impact on immigrant quality is not in dispute. This act more 
than doubled the number of employment immigrants, so that its principal 
composition effect was to raise average immigrant quality. Empirically, 
figure 5.5 shows that the large increase in employment visas was concen- 
trated in EH countries. As mentioned above, there were possible within- 
group skill effects as well. To examine this question, table 5.5  lists mea- 
sures of occupation incomes for employment principals and male spouses 
in the years immediately before and after the year in which the act became 
effective. In addition to the large increase in the numbers of immigrants, 
the 1990 act shifted the composition of employment principal immigrants 
toward the more skilled. That implication is confirmed in table 5.5  as the 
occupation incomes of employment visas in both hemispheres are higher 
after the act became effective than before. This increase in  occupation 
incomes of employment visas was greater in the Western Hemisphere, sug- 
gesting that the principal impact on within-group skill may flow from the 
restriction  on low-skill employment visas-a  restriction  that was more 
relevant in the Western Hemisphere. We  also anticipated a larger reduc- 
tion in the skill of spouse immigrants in the Western Hemisphere since the 
reduction in the number of unskilled visas would lead to a greater inflow 
of them into the spousal category in the Western Hemisphere. 
5.6  Results 
Table 5.6 reports the fixed-effects estimates for the husbands of immi- 
grants. The first column lists estimates for the ratio of the number of hus- 
band immigrants to the origin-country population, and the second col- 
umn reports the coefficients for the average occupational earnings of those 
immigrants.  As  explained  above, the  gains  to  migration-and  conse- 
quently the larger the number of migrants per country-are  positively re- The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  219 
Table 5.6  Estimates: Immigrant Men Admitted as Husbands of US. Citizens, 
1972-90 
Variable 
Immigrants/  Log of Average 
Home Country  Occupational 
Population  Earnings 
Origin country and U.S. economic variables 
Origin-country PPP GDP per worker 
Origin-country average In education 
U.S. GDP per worker (1985s) 
(1985 dollars) 
U.S. In education per worke1 
Time trend 
Proportion of immigrants who adjusted 
Proportion reporting an occupation 
status 
1970 occupational categories 
Incomplete data years 
U.S. immigration law regime 
Preference system 
Preference system*WH 
Marriage fraud-IRCA  legalization 
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Note: Absolute values of robust t-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations = 2,387. 
Number of countries = 145. Income observations are weighted by the number of immigrants. 
WH = Western Hemisphere. 
lated to U.S. skill prices and are negatively correlated with skill prices in 
sending countries. Our empirical estimates for origin-country economic 
variables support these theoretical expectations. A higher per capita in- 
come in the origin country leads to a statistically significant drop in out- 
migration  rates, while  (holding  constant  GDP) an increase in  average 
schooling increases the number  of  male spouse migrants to the United 
States. Similarly, an increase in  sending-country-specific schooling per 
worker (holding constant GDP) lowers skill prices and makes immigration 
more advantageous for lower-skilled workers. This prediction is supported 
by the statistically significant effect of country schooling in the model for 220  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
log of average occupational earnings listed in the second column of table 
5.6. Not surprisingly, it is more difficult to obtain robust estimates for the 
U.S. counterpart variables since we  must rely on time-series variation in 
two collinear series (GDP and average schooling per worker) that are com- 
mon to all sending countries. Yet, even here, we obtain a statistically sig- 
nificant negative effect on US. education per worker, implying that lower 
skill prices  in  the United  States discourage international  migration  to 
America. However, we  are unable to detect any effects of the U.S.  eco- 
nomic variables in the income model, no doubt due to the collinearity in 
the two variables. 
The immigration law regime variables indicate both direct and indirect 
effects of law-regime changes. As was expected, the regression results in 
table 5.6 show differential effects by  hemisphere. In the Eastern Hemi- 
sphere, the integration of preferences leads to an effective increase in em- 
ployment visas, easing the pressures on marriage visas there. However, 
applying  the  preference  system to the Western  Hemisphere  should in- 
crease the number  of husband immigrants per country (in the Western 
Hemisphere). Such additional WH immigrants added to the pool at that 
time were evidently more skilled (there was implicit skill screening of WH 
applicants before integration), raising the average quality of WH spousal 
immigrants. However, we find no effect of integration on average quality 
of spouses in the Eastern Hemisphere. 
Similarly, the combined legislation cracking down  on marriage fraud 
and IRCA had a statistically significant depressing effect on the number of 
spouse immigrants, equally for WH and EH immigrants. If the dominant 
substitution induced by the lowering of fraudulent marriages is to increase 
illegals (employment visas), then the average quality of the remaining mar- 
riage visas should rise (fall). The impact of fewer prospective immigrants 
who decide not to marry a U.S. citizen due to IRCA should increase the 
average quality  of the remaining spouse visas. Our empirical estimates 
indicate that the combined effects of IRCA and movement into illegals 
dominated for the Eastern Hemisphere (increasing average quality of mar- 
riages), while movement  into employment  may have dominated  in  the 
Western Hemisphere, where average quality of marriages declined. 
Table 5.7 presents the estimates for the average occupational earnings 
of the employment immigrants. Decreasing skill prices in sending coun- 
tries or increasing skill prices in the United States should, through immi- 
grant selectivity, lower the average quality of employment immigrants. The 
negative estimated coefficient on origin-country In education and the posi- 
tive coefficient on US. GDP  per worker both support this hypothesis. The 
coefficients estimated in table 5.7 suggest no net effect of expansion in 
employment immigrants in the Eastern Hemisphere on employment immi- 
grant earnings. This may reflect offsetting effects of the expanding pool 
lowering within-group quality on the margin and the fact that more-skilled 
visas were increasingly used in  the Eastern Hemisphere. Finally, our re- The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States  221 
Table 5.7  Fixed Effects Estimates: Log of Average Occupational Earnings for 
Immigrant Principal Men with Employment Visas, 1972-90 
Variable  All Employment 
Origin country and U.S. economic variables 
Origin-country PPP GDP per worker (1985$) 
Origin-country average In education 
U.S. GDP per worker (1985$) 
U.S. In education per worker 
Time trend 
Proportion of immigrants who adjusted status 
Proportion reporting an occupation 
1970 occupational categories 
Incomplete data years 
U.S. immigration law regime 
Preference system*EH 
Marriage fraud-IRCA  legalization 

























Note: Absolute values of robust t-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations = 2,387. 
Number of countries  145. Income observations are weighted by the number of immigrants. 
EH = Eastern Hemisphere. 
sults in table 5.6 indicated that there may have been an increased flow in 
the Western Hemisphere into employment visas that lowered the average 
quality of marriage. The results in table 5.7 indicate, interestingly, that the 
marriage fraud legislation may have decreased average skill levels in both 
the husband and employment visa categories for WH immigrants-such 
immigrants  were  evidently of  above-average skill among spouse immi- 
grants but of below-average skill among employment immigrants. How- 
ever, the opposite was evidently true for EH immigrants. 
5.7  Conclusion 
This paper has reexamined one of the central questions in immigration 
research in the last few decades-secular  trends in the “labor market qual- 
ity” of new immigrants. Based on the conventional surveys used to exam- 222  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
ine thiq question, an almost universal consensus had been reached: The 
labor market quality of new recent immigrants is quite low and has been 
declining relative to skills of  native-born Americans. Despite their wide- 
spread use, we argue in this paper that these conventional surveys provide 
quite flawed data for this question.  These data are flawed because it is 
impossible to determine when the foreign-born population in these con- 
ventional surveys actually arrived in the United States and, therefore, how 
recent they actually are. The data are also deficient since a significant frdC- 
tion of the foreign-born population included in these surveys are not legal 
immigrants at all, but instead represent an uncertain amalgam of legal, 
illegal, and nonimmigrant populations.  In our view, these data problems 
are sufficiently serious to call into question most prior research on this 
question.  Another  serious problem  with most existing research  is that, 
somewhat remarkably, it deals with this issue without any recognition or 
discussion of the legal rules governing the number of immigrants who may 
enter and the criteria by which they are selected. In part, this neglect of 
the legal environment  is because conventional labor market surveys do 
not distinguish the foreign-born population by visa type. 
Given these problems with conventional labor market surveys, we turn 
to an alternative data resource-INS  records of legal immigrants over the 
period  1972-95-that  allows us to examine not only the changing  skill 
composition of legal immigrants but also how these changes were influ- 
enced by  alterations in immigration law regimes and changing economic 
conditions in sending countries and the United States. These data paint a 
quite different portrait  of the labor market  quality of legal immigrants. 
First, especially if we abstract from the special refugee population, during 
most of the last 25 years, the labor market quality of male legal immigrants 
has been as high as or higher than that of male native-born workers. Sec- 
ond, while the relative labor market quality of male legal immigrants was 
falling during the 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a steady rise in 
the quality  of  legal  immigrants  during  the  last  half  of  the  1980s and 
throughout the 1990s. 
In this paper, we  also examined the reasons for these secular trends in 
the labor market quality  of legal immigrants. In our view,  these trends 
result both from a series of changes in the legal regime governing immigra- 
tion to the United States and from behavioral choices made by prospective 
immigrants  (and  the  migrant  skill  selectivity  that  results  from  those 
choices) in light  of changing  economic conditions in  sending countries 
and the United States. In addition to a large influx of refugees, there were 
two regime changes that contributed to the early period of declining labor 
market quality of immigrants. Legislation enacted in 1976 that extended 
the preference system to the Western Hemisphere helped produce a large 
increase in the number of visas for permanent residence obtained by mar- The Changing Skill of New  Immigrants to the United States  223 
rying a U.S. citizen. While having little effect on overall numbers, a sepa- 
rate 1976 law severely restricted the granting of employment visas to for- 
eign  physicians, thereby lowering the average skill of legal immigrants. 
Similarly, there were three principal changes in the legal rules that helped 
produce  the post-1986 rise in labor market quality of legal immigrants. 
First, the Marriage Fraud act led to a decline (especially among residents 
of Mexico) in the numbers of people who become permanent residents by 
marrying U.S. citizens. Second, IRCA, by easing one route to legalization, 
apparently made the alternative path of marriage to U.S. citizens less at- 
tractive. Finally, the Immigration Act of 1990 almost tripled the ceilings 
for the relatively high-skilled employment visas while at the same time 
reducing the numbers of low-skill employment visas issued. 
Legal regime changes alone cannot fully explain secular trends in the 
numbers and quality of legal immigrants. The annual volume of migration 
flows and the skill selectivity of  migrants who arrive also are based on 
comparisons of economic conditions in sending countries and the United 
States. This is especially true in the numerically unrestricted category of 
those who obtain permanent resident visas by marrying U.S. citizens. The 
empirical estimates summarized in this paper are consistent with our theo- 
retical framework. First, the volume of migration per capita is positively 
associated with lower sending-country skill prices. In addition, the average 
skills of migrants decline as sending-country skill prices (and migration 
costs) fall relative to those skill prices in the United States. Both our theo- 
retical and empirical models imply that trends in the average labor market 
quality of immigrants are a negative function of the skill price gap between 
potential sending countries and the United States. For example, rising skill 
prices in sending countries (relative to the United States) since the mid- 
1980s contributed to the rising labor market quality of legal immigrants. 224  Guillermina Jasso, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P.  Smith 
Appendix 
80 = Based on 1980 Census 
90 = Baaed on 1990 Census 
Fig. 5A.1  Average occupational income, by census coding 
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